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RESEARCH ARTICLE
Can You Spot a Liar? Deception, Mindreading, and the Case of
Autism Spectrum Disorder
David M. Williams , Toby Nicholson, Catherine Grainger, Sophie E. Lind, and Peter Carruthers
Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life and might require “mindreading” (the
ability to represent others’ mental states). People with diminished mindreading, such as those with autism spectrum
disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation because of lie detection difficulties. In Experiment 1, performance
among 216 neurotypical adults on a realistic lie detection paradigm was significantly negatively associated with num-
ber of ASD traits, but not with mindreading ability. Bayesian analyses complemented null hypothesis significance
testing and suggested the data supported the alternative hypothesis in this key respect. Cross validation of results was
achieved by randomly splitting the full sample into two subsamples of 108 and rerunning analyses. The association
between lie detection and ASD traits held in both subsamples, showing the reliability of findings. In Experiment 2,
lie detection was significantly impaired in 27 adults with a diagnosis of ASD relative to 27 matched comparison par-
ticipants. Results suggest that people with ASD (or ASD traits) may be particularly vulnerable to manipulation and
may benefit from lie detection training. Autism Res 2018, 0: 000–000. VC 2018 The Authors Autism Research pub-
lished by International Society for Autism Research and Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Lay Summary: Detection of deception is of fundamental importance for everyday social life. People with diminished
understanding of other minds, such as those with autism spectrum disorder (ASD), might be at risk of manipulation
because of lie detection difficulties. We found that lie detection ability was related to how many ASD traits neurotypi-
cal people manifested and also was significantly diminished among adults with a full diagnosis of ASD.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorder; deception; lie detection; metacognition; mindreading; social cognition; theory
of mind
Introduction
The ability to detect when one is being deceived by
others is of fundamental importance for everyday social
life and difficulties detecting deception increase one’s
risk of being manipulated, with potentially serious con-
sequences. Nonetheless, neurotypical adults tend to
assume others are telling the truth (a default “truth-
bias”) and their ability to distinguish truths from lies in
experimental situations is only just above chance, albeit
statistically significantly so [54% across studies; Bond &
DePaulo, 2008]. Moreover, there are few (if any) charac-
teristics (e.g., age, sex, education) that appear reliably
associated with lie detection ability [Aamodt & Custer,
2006]. These findings have led some to suggest that
people vary in the extent to which they manifest
behavioral indicators of honesty/deceit and that
accurate inferences are possible only when judging peo-
ple who provide consistent cues [e.g., Levine et al.,
2011]. In other words, some honest individuals provide
clear behavioral cues to indicate they are honest and
some liars provide clear cues that they are dishonest.
These relatively “transparent” individuals will be
easier to make accurate judgments about than
“nontransparent” liars, who hide the behavioral cues
associated with lying, and nontransparent truth-tellers
who emit signs of dishonesty even though they are
honest. Regardless, it may be that the ability to detect
lies even in transparent individuals is underpinned by a
particular set of psychological mechanisms or social
experiences that have not yet been elucidated. More-
over, certain groups of people might have a diminished
ability to detect lies, rendering them at particular risk of
manipulation and social difficulties.
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Intuitively, the abilities to lie and detect lies are an
aspect of mindreading—the ability to explain and pre-
dict behavior in terms of underlying mental states
(beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.). Lying to somebody
involves an attempt to induce a false belief in them
and, likewise, detection of someone else’s lie requires
interpretation of a person’s behavior in terms of their
intention to induce a false belief [Sip, Roepstorff,
McGregor, & Frith, 2008]. Indeed, some have suggested
that mindreading evolved precisely because it conferred
an adaptive ability to manipulate others and detect
when one is being manipulated without the need for
physical conflict [e.g., Byrne & Whiten, 1997].
Although it is intuitive to consider lie detection as an
aspect of mindreading, no studies have, to our knowl-
edge, investigated the link between the two directly
[although detection of suspicious behavior from audi-
tory cues may be linked to mindreading ability; Brewer,
Ying, Young, & Nah, 2018].
If there is a link between deception detection ability
and mindreading ability, then individuals with dimin-
ished mindreading ability should also show impover-
ished lie detection skill. This is especially pertinent
when considering the case of autism spectrum disorder
(ASD). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder diagnosed
on the basis of severe behavioral impairments in social-
communication and behavioral flexibility [American
Psychiatric Association, 2013] that appear to be caused
in part by an underlying deficit in mindreading [see
Brunsdon & Happe, 2013; Jones et al., 2018]. People
with ASD are thought to be particularly vulnerable to
social manipulation, in part because of a difficulty in
understanding lies. However, such a hypothesized diffi-
culty with lie detection ability has never been investi-
gated directly. Using cartoon-type paradigms, studies
have shown that individuals with ASD have difficulties
understanding “double bluff,” in distinguishing lies from
sarcasm/irony [Happe, 1994]. However, it is unclear how
these indirect findings map on to true lie detection abil-
ity in realistic (nonhypothetical) situations. Moreover,
even if lie detection ability turns out to be impoverished
in ASD, it is not clear whether such a deficit is caused by
the mindreading deficit that is well-established in this
disorder or by some other factor.
In the current study, two experiments investigated
the underpinnings of lie detection ability and the
extent to which it is impaired in ASD. In Experiment 1,
we employed a realistic lie detection paradigm among
216 neurotypical adults. This task involved watching
clips of university students being interviewed about
whether they had cheated in an experiment that took
place before the interview began. Half of the videos
involved students who had cheated, but denied doing
so, and half involved noncheating truth-tellers. Ten of
the videos showed transparent individuals, who gave
relatively clear behavioral cues as to the veracity of
their statements, and 10 showed nontransparent indi-
viduals whose behavioral cues were known to be diffi-
cult to interpret [based on ratings by judges in Levine,
Shaw, & Shulman, 2010]. In Experiment 1, participants
judged whether or not each individual was telling the
truth. In addition, participants completed two widely
employed cognitive-experimental tests of mindreading
ability, as well as a self-report measure of ASD traits. We
predicted that ASD traits would be negatively associated
with overall accuracy of lie detection judgments and with
accuracy of judgments of transparent individuals in par-
ticular (higher ASD traits5 lower lie detection accuracy).
In each case, we predicted that the significant association
would be mediated by mindreading ability.
It is important to stress that many consider ASD to be
a spectrum, given that (among other things) features of
the disorder are distributed continuously throughout
the general population with no clear separation
between typical and clinical levels [e.g., Frazier et al.,
2014], and family members of people with ASD fre-
quently have elevated, but nonclinical, levels of ASD
features relative to the population average [e.g., Piven
et al., 1994]. Thus, studying individual differences in
ASD traits and their relation to cognitive abilities in the
general population has the potential to make an impor-
tant contribution to our understanding of ASD itself.
However, while there is continuity between ASD traits
in the population and ASD features in diagnosed cases,
there can still be qualitative differences in the cognitive
mechanisms that underpin those traits in each popula-
tion [e.g., Peterson, Wellman, & Liu, 2005]. Therefore, a
full understanding requires the study of diagnosed cases,
as well as traits in the general population. Thus, in Exper-
iment 2, a group of adults with a full diagnosis of ASD,
as well as age- and IQ-matched comparison participants,
completed the lie detection task, as well as measures ASD
traits/feature severity. We predicted that participants with
ASD would show significantly lower overall accuracy on
the lie detection task. We further predicted that this
diminution would be most pronounced when judging
transparent individuals, given that even neurotypical
comparison participants might show low accuracy when
judging nontransparent individuals.
Experiment 1: Method
Participants
Two hundred and sixteen students (175 female) from
the University of Kent (UK) took part in the experi-
ment. The average age of participants was 19.38 years
(SD52.35; range518–41) years. No participant had a
history of ASD, according to self-report. All participants
gave informed consent and received course credit in
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partial fulfillment of their degree, for taking part in the
study. The study (comprising Experiments 1 and 2) was
ethically approved by School of Psychology Research
Ethics Committee at the University of Kent.
Materials and Procedures
Lie detection task. The 20 videos employed by
Levine et al. [2011] and taken from Levine [200722011]
were used in this study. Each video showed an adult
being interviewed about their earlier participation in an
experiment during which they had the opportunity to
cheat by looking at an answer sheet while the experi-
menter was out of the room. An objective indicator of
whether the individual had cheated was available,
because (unknown to the individual) the individual’s
partner during the earlier experiment was actually a
confederate. During the interview, individuals were
asked a range of questions (e.g., about their enjoyment
of trivia games). Crucially, at a particular point in the
interview, the individuals were asked three questions
about their behavior during the experiment. Two ques-
tions asked directly about cheating (“Did any cheating
occur when the experimenter left the room?”; “Are you
telling me the truth?”) and one was strategically
designed to elicit behavioral cues of lie-/truth-telling
(“What will your partner say when I ask her the same
questions?”). Only the portion of the interviews that
included the three critical questions were included in
the current study. Half of the videos included individu-
als who had not cheated (truth-tellers) and half
included individuals who had cheated and who lied
about this in the interview (liars). Importantly, the 20
videos employed in the current study were a subsample
of 44 videos already rated by a large sample of judges in
Levine et al. [2010]. Based on ratings of the 44 videos
in Levine et al.’s [2010] study, the 20 videos employed
in the current study were selected to contain a mixture
of transparent and nontransparent individuals. This
mixture was included to increase the range of responses
and levels of accuracy among participants in the cur-
rent study (in both experiments 1 and 2). In Experi-
ment 1, we were particularly interested in the extent to
which a person could read clear behavioral signs of
deceit (in the condition involving transparent individu-
als) was associated with the number of ASD traits that
they manifested (and, in Experiment 2, we were partic-
ularly interested in the extent to which individuals
with a full diagnosis of ASD could detect these clear
behavioral cues in the transparent condition).
Participants watched each video once and made a cat-
egorical judgment about whether the person being
interviewed was lying or telling the truth about
whether they cheated during the experiment. Videos
were presented in a pseudo-random order. Overall accu-
racy on the task was established using corrected hit rate
[(proportion of truths correctly identified1proportion
of lies correctly identified)2 (proportion of truths incor-
rectly judged as lies1proportion of lies incorrectly
judged as truths)]. A corrected hit rate (CHR) of zero
would indicate chance-level judgments on the task.
CHR was also calculated separately for the transparent
and nontransparent conditions. Finally, the proportion
of truth judgments made by participants, independent
of accuracy, was calculated. The higher the proportion,
the greater the truth bias (i.e., tendency to believe that
individuals in the videos were telling the truth).
Mindreading tasks. Reading the mind in the eyes task.
The Reading the mind in the eyes (RMIE) task [Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001] is a
widely used measure of mindreading in clinical and non-
clinical populations. Participants were presented with a
series of 36 photographs of the eye-region of the face.
On each trial, participants were asked to pick one word
from a selection of four to indicate what the person in
the picture was thinking or feeling. Scores on the RMIE
task range from a possible 0–36, with higher scores indi-
cating better performance on the task.
Animations task. We employed a version of the
“Animations” task as a second measure of mindreading
[e.g., Abell, Happe, & Frith, 2000]. The task, which is
based on Heider and Simmel [1944], required partici-
pants to describe interactions between a large red trian-
gle and a small blue triangle, as portrayed in a series of
silent video clips. Four clips were apt to invoke an
explanation of the triangles’ behavior in terms of epi-
stemic mental states, such as belief, intention, and
deception. These clips comprise the “mentalizing” con-
dition of the task and were employed in this study.
Each clip was presented to participants on a com-
puter screen. After the clip was finished, participants
described what had happened in the clip. An audio
recording of participants’ responses was made for later
transcription. Transcriptions were scored on a scale of
0–2 for accuracy (including reference to specific mental
states), based on the criteria outlined in Abell et al.
[2000]. Twenty percent of transcripts were also scored
by two independent raters. Inter-rater reliability was
excellent according to Cicchetti’s [1994] criteria (intra-
class correlations >.82).
A Z score was calculated for each mindreading task.
The two Z scores were then averaged to form a compos-
ite mindreading score. The composite was used in bivar-
iate and partial correlation analyses in order to reduce
the number of statistical comparisons and maximize
power. However, following an anonymous reviewer’s
suggestion, we also report post hoc correlations with
RMIE and Animations separately.
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Measure of ASD traits. Autism-spectrum quo-
tient. The Autism-spectrum Quotient [AQ; Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley,
2001]. The AQ is used widely, and is a valid and reliable
measure of ASD traits in people with a full diagnosis
and in the general population. Participants read state-
ments (e.g., “I find social situations easy”; “I find
myself drawn more strongly to people than to things”)
and decide the extent to which each statement applies
to them, responding on a 4-point Likert scale, ranging
from “definitely agree” to “definitely disagree.” Scores
range from 0 to 50, with higher scores indicating more
ASD traits.1
Statistical Power and Analysis
Details of power calculations can be found in Support-
ing Information. An increasingly used supplement to
power analyses and null hypothesis significance testing
in general is to calculate a Bayes factor for each key
analysis. Bayesian analyses provide an estimation of the
relative strength of a finding for one hypothesis over
another (i.e., the alternative hypothesis over the null,
or vice versa), which allows a more graded interpreta-
tion of the data than is possible using P values or effect
sizes alone [e.g., Dienes, 2014; Rouder, Speckman, Sun,
Morey, & Iverson, 2009]. According to Jeffreys’ [1961]
criteria, Bayes factors (BF10)>3 provide firm evidence
for the alternative hypothesis (with values >10, >30,
and >100 providing strong, very strong, and decisive
evidence, respectively) and values under 1 provide evi-
dence for the null (with values <0.33 providing firm
evidence). BF10 values can be considered to reflect the
likelihood that the alternative hypothesis is more likely
to be true than the null hypothesis. Hence, a BF10 of 3
suggests the alternative hypothesis is three times more
likely to be true than the null hypothesis. Bayesian
analyses were conducted using JASP 0.8.1 [JASP Team,
2016].
Experiment 1: Results
Performance on the Lie Detection and Background Tasks
Means (SD) for performance on the experimental and
background tasks are presented in Table 1. A repeated-
measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), with Condition
(transparent/nontransparent) as the within-participants
variable, was conducted on accuracy data from the
deception detection task. The effect of Condition was
significant, reflecting significantly greater accuracy in
the transparent condition than in the nontransparent
condition, F(1, 215)51105.13, P< .001, g2p5 .84. One-
sample t-tests showed that overall accuracy (i.e., CHR)
and accuracy (CHR) in the transparent condition was
significantly above chance, ts>21.20, ps< .001,
BF10s>100. However, CHR in the nontransparent con-
dition was significantly below chance, t57.54, P< .001
BF10 >100. Finally, participants showed a significant
truth bias, t58.01, P< .001, BF10>100.
2
Association Analyses
Associations between each of the key dependent variables
on the lie detection task and performance on each of the
background measures are presented in Table 2. As pre-
dicted, AQ score was significantly negatively associated
with overall accuracy (CHR) on the lie detection task.
Moreover, AQ score was significantly negatively associ-
ated with accuracy of judgments in the transparent con-
dition (as predicted). However, neither the size of the
Table 1. Mean (SD) Performance on Tasks in Experiment 1
(N5 216 Participants)
Variable Mean (SD)
Lie detection
CHR: overall .28 (.19)
CHR: transparent condition .71 (.27)
CHR: nontransparent condition 2.14 (.27)
Truth bias .56 (.11)
Background measures
AQ total 17.00 (6.66)
RMIE 25.24 (4.14)
Animations 4.19 (1.96)
Table 2. Bivariate Correlations in Experiment 1
1 2 3 4 5 6
1. CHR: overall – .70***b .71***b .11 2.18**a .04
2. CHR: transparent
condition
– – .05 .04 2.26***b .09
3. CHR:
nontransparent
condition
– – – .11 <.01 2.04
4. Truth bias – – – – 2.10 .05
5. AQ total – – – – – 2.13*
6. Mindreading
composite
– – – – – –
***P< .001; **P< .01; *P< .05.
a BF10> 3.
b BF10> 100.
AQ5 autism-spectrum quotient; CHR5 corrected hit rate;
RMIE5 reading the mind in the eyes.
1In addition to the AQ, participants also completed the Toronto
Alexithymia Questionnaire (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994). The
TAS-20 is a 20-item self-report measure of self-awareness of one’s emo-
tional and physical states. The TAS was completed as part of a wider
investigation of the relation between mindreading and self-awareness,
but was not central to the current study and so was not included in
analyses.
2There were no significant differences between males and females in
terms of either level of accuracy or patterns of performance across con-
ditions, all ps> .22, all g2p < .007, all BF10s<0.33.
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truth bias, nor accuracy of judgments in the nontranspar-
ent condition, correlated significantly with AQ. Impor-
tantly, none of the lie detection dependent variables was
associated with the mindreading composite score. Note
also that none of the lie detection dependent variables
was associated significantly with either RMIE (all rs .02,
all ps .73) or animations (all rs .12, all ps .09) mind-
reading tasks when they were analyzed individually.
To investigate further the significant association
between lie detection accuracy and AQ, two partial cor-
relation analyses were conducted. The association
between overall CHR and AQ remained significant after
controlling for mindreading composite score, rp52.17,
P5 .01. Controlling for RMIE or animations task perfor-
mance separately produced the same results as when the
composite mindreading score was controlled (ps .01).
Likewise, the association between CHR in the transpar-
ent condition and AQ remained significant after control-
ling for mindreading composite score, rp52.25,
P< .001. Controlling for RMIE or animations task perfor-
mance separately produced the same results as when the
composite mindreading score was controlled (ps .001).
Cross-Validation of Results
Given that a number of authors have suggested that sig-
nificant correlates of lie detection ability may not be
replicable across studies [e.g., Aamodt & Custer, 2006;
Bond & DePaulo, 2008], we assessed the reliability of
the current findings by randomly splitting our sample
into two groups of 108 participants and reanalyzing the
data in each subsample.3
The association between CHR in the transparent con-
dition and AQ after controlling for score on the mind-
reading composite measure was significant in both
Subsample 1, rp52.23, P5 .02, and Subsample 2,
rp52.27, P5 .005. The association between overall
CHR and AQ after controlling for score on the mind-
reading composite measure was significant in Subsam-
ple 1, rp52.22, P5 .02, but marginally nonsignificant
in subsample 2 when reported one-tailed, rp52.13,
P5 .08. Fisher’s Z tests revealed that the difference in
the size of these associations in the total sample, sub-
sample 1, and subsample 2 were all nonsignificant (all
Zs<0.44, all ps> .67). Note that all results were sub-
stantively identical when analyses controlled for RMIE
and Animations task performance separately (i.e., no
result that was significant when controlling for the
mindreading composite score became nonsignificant
when controlling for RMIE and Animations task perfor-
mance separately; vice versa, no result that was nonsig-
nificant became significant).
Experiment 2: Method
Participants
Twenty-seven adults with ASD and 27 neurotypical
comparison adults took part. All participants completed
the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale for Intelligence-II
[Wechsler, 1999], which provides verbal, performance,
and full-scale IQ scores. Participant characteristics and
matching statistics are presented in Table 3. Participants
in the ASD group had received verified diagnoses,
according to conventional criteria [American Psychiatric
Association, 2000; World Health Organisation, 1992].
No participant in either group reported current use of
psychotropic medication or illegal recreational drugs,
and none reported any history of neurological or psy-
chiatric illness other than ASD.
Materials and Procedures
Participants from each group completed the same ver-
sions of the lie detection task and AQ as participants
completed in Experiment 1. In addition, participants
with ASD completed the Autism Diagnostic Observation
Schedule [ADOS; Lord et al., 2000], a detailed observa-
tional assessment of ASD features.
Experiment 2: Results
Performance on the Lie Detection and Background Tasks
A mixed ANOVA was conducted on lie detection
CHR, with Group (ASD/comparison) as the between-
Table 3. Participant Characteristics and Matching Statistics for Experiment 2
ASD
(n5 27; 20 male)
Comparison
(n5 27; 17 male) t P d
Age (years) 33.13 (13.64) 33.60 (11.83) 0.14 .89 0.04
VIQ 104.96 (11.08) 105.52 (7.97) 0.21 .83 0.05
PIQ 103.52 (14.19) 104.37 (11.20) 0.25 .81 0.07
FSIQ 104.44 (11.03) 105.67 (8.83) 0.45 .66 0.12
AQ total 30.04 (9.33) 16.30 (6.05) 6.42 <.001 1.75
ADOS 8.13 (4.94) – – – –
ADOS5 autism diagnostic observation schedule; AQ5 autism-spectrum quotient; FSIQ5 full scale IQ; PIQ5 performance IQ; VIQ5 verbal IQ.
3There were no significant differences between the subsamples in
characteristics (age, gender ratio), performance on the background tasks
(RMIE, Animations, AQ), all ps> .29, all ds<0.15, all BF10s<0.25 or lie
detection accuracy (all ps> .78, all g2p < .001, all BF10s<0.15).
INSAR Williams et al./Lie detection in ASD 5
participants variable and Condition (transparent/non-
transparent) as the within-participants variable. This
analysis revealed significant main effects of Condition,
F(1, 52)5174.72, P< .001, g2p5 .77, and Group, F(1,
52)53.94, P5 .05, g2p5 .07, and a significant interac-
tion between these variables, F(1, 52)58.48, P5 .005,
g2p5 .14. Figure 1 shows the breakdown of performance
by ASD and comparison participants in each condition.
CHR in the transparent condition was substantially and
significantly lower among ASD participants (M5 .46,
SD5 .36) than among comparison participants (M5 .72,
SD5 .23), t53.16, P5 .003, d50.86, BF10527.86,
albeit significantly above chance among both groups,
all ts>6.65, all ps< .001, all BF10s>100. In contrast,
CHR in the nontransparent condition was almost iden-
tical among ASD participants (M52.05, SD5 .27) and
comparison participants (M52.08, SD5 .24), t50.42,
P5 .67, d50.11, BF1050.30, and nonsignificantly
below chance in both groups, ts>6.65, all ps< .001, all
BF10s<0.33. In sum, participants with ASD showed a
significant diminution of overall lie detection accuracy
and this was particularly large in the transparent condi-
tion. Finally, both groups of participants showed a
truth bias and there was no significant difference
between participants with ASD (M5 .55, SD5 .15) and
comparison participants (M5 .57, SD5 .12) in the size
of the bias, t50.41, P5 .69, d50.15, BF1050.29.
3
Association Analyses
A series of bivariate correlation analyses were conducted
to explore the association between lie detection ability
and ASD traits/features. However, these were exploratory
and not necessarily reliable given the small sample size in
Experiment 2 relative to that in Experiment 1.
Among participant groups combined (n554), overall
CHR was nonsignificantly associated with AQ (r52.18,
P5 .20, BF1050.69), although the correlation was
almost identical in magnitude to that observed among
participants in Experiment 1 (Table 2). These correla-
tions remained nonsignificant when explored in each
diagnostic group separately (ps> .67). In the ASD group,
ADOS was nonsignificantly associated with overall
CHR, r52.03, P5 .88, BF1050.28.
Among participant groups combined, CHR in the
transparent condition was associated significantly with
AQ (r52.28, P5 .04, BF1052.50). However, neither of
these correlations was significant when explored in
each diagnostic group separately (all ps> .89). In the
ASD group, ADOS was nonsignificantly associated with
CHR in the transparent condition (r52.20, P5 .35,
BF1050.63).
General Discussion
In Experiment 1, overall CHR (i.e., overall lie detection
accuracy) was significantly above chance, replicating
previous studies. However, when looking at each condi-
tion separately, it became clear that only judgments
in the transparent condition were significantly above
chance. This was expected, given previous findings of
low lie detection accuracy when judging nontranspar-
ent individuals [Levine et al., 2011]. Most importantly,
and in keeping with predictions, lie detection accuracy
was significantly negatively associated with number of
ASD traits in Experiment 1. This was true for overall
accuracy, as well as for accuracy in the transparent con-
dition. Importantly, these results held in two subsam-
ples (each comprising 108 participants) created by
randomly splitting the total sample in half. Given that
some have argued that reliable correlates of lie detec-
tion ability may never be found [see Bond & DePaulo,
2008], the replication of the link between lie detection
and ASD traits in the current study is striking.
Arguably, the association between lie detection and
ASD traits should not be surprising, given that such
judgments are fundamentally social in nature and that
ASD is at its core a disorder of social functioning and
cognition. However, contrary to predictions, this associ-
ation was not mediated by mindreading ability.
Although there are some questions over the ecological
validity of the animations and RMIE tasks [e.g., Cook,
Brewer, Shah, & Bird, 2013], we included them as mea-
sures of mindreading in the current study for several
reasons. For example, unlike other classic measures
(e.g., false belief tasks), they are sensitive to mindread-
ing impairments among intellectually high-functioning
individuals with ASD and to variation in mindreading
skills among neurotypical individuals [e.g., Castelli
et al., 2002; Lind et al., 2013]. The fact that deception
detection ability was not associated with performance
on either the animations or RMIE task (or a composite
Figure 1. Mean performance on lie detection task in Experi-
ment 2, in both the ASD and comparison group. Error bars rep-
resent one SEM. *P< .01.
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of performance across both tasks), suggests that lie
detection ability is not related to mindreading ability
directly. Rather, lie detection ability might develop as a
function of the degree to which one engages with
others socially, and attends to and learns from behav-
ioral cues. As ASD traits increase, the tendency to engage
in the kind of social interaction that would provide a
means of learning about such behavioral cues is reduced.
Although mindreading clearly contributes to social-
communication ability (better mindreaders are more
socially skilled), the mere tendency to initiate social inter-
action may not depend on mindreading [Frith, Happe, &
Siddons, 1994]. Therefore, a sufficient degree of social
engagement, along with general-purpose learning abilities,
may be enough to learn the behavioral cues associated
with transparent truths and lies.
Importantly, the results from Experiment 2 were
striking and complemented those from Experiment 1.
Adults with a diagnosis of ASD showed significantly
diminished lie detection ability, relative to closely
matched neurotypical participants. The impairment
when judging videos of transparent individuals was
associated with a large effect size, reflecting the fact
that judgments by participants with ASD about trans-
parent individuals were almost half as accurate as those
made by comparison participants. This shows that even
when people provide clear behavioral cues about their
honesty or deceit, individuals with ASD nonetheless
have significant difficulty making accurate judgments.
For example, a clear verbal indicator of dishonesty is
apparent in one of the videos, in which an individual
claims not to have cheated when the interviewer asks
“Did any cheating occur when the experimenter left
the room?” but makes a Freudian slip and answers “no”
to the follow-up question, “Are you telling me the
truth, right now?” before correcting himself and saying
“I mean, yes”. In another of the videos, an individual
responds, “I guess no” to the question “Did any cheat-
ing occur when the experimenter left the room?” We
suggest that such behavioral cues would cause most
neurotypical individuals to suspect deceit, but yet par-
ticipants with ASD in the current study found it diffi-
cult to make such an inference when clear behavioral
cues were available. Clearly, this difficulty renders indi-
viduals with a full diagnosis at risk of manipulation
even by transparent individuals whose lies would be
readily detectable by neurotypical individuals.
The underlying reasons for the observed lie detection dif-
ficulties in people with ASD are yet to be established. As
argued above, they may be attributable to insufficient
learning opportunities, which are the consequence of social
impairments. Alternatively, there may be ASD-specific cog-
nitive differences that make deception detection more diffi-
cult. For example, the fact that lie detection inherently
carries a high executive load (receivers must hold in mind
and evaluate multiple cues, and consider counterfactual
information) may mean that people with ASD—who often
have executive difficulties—may be overloaded.
Irrespective of the underlying explanation for lie
detection difficulties in ASD, it is important to consider
whether training individuals with ASD to detect the
behavioral indicators of lying (e.g., providing a vague
or implausible account with few specific details; appear-
ing ambivalent; assertions that lack of certainty/asser-
tiveness) would be beneficial. Notably, such lie
detection training has produced limited success in
increasing discrimination accuracy among neurotypical
adults [e.g., Frank & Feeley, 2003]. This may be because
less-than-perfect lie detection accuracy among neuro-
typical individuals is not the result of a lack of awareness
of the behavioral cues associated with truth-telling and
lying, but because the cues themselves are not consis-
tently strong indicators [Hartwig & Bond, 2011]. In that
case, instructing neurotypical individuals about behav-
ioral indicators of lying that they are already aware of
will not be fruitful. However, given that participants
with ASD had such difficulties discriminating truths
and lies told by even transparent individuals who dis-
played clear signs of their honesty or dishonesty, it
seems likely that individuals with ASD are not fully
aware of the cues that can be used to discriminate
truth-telling and lying. As such, providing explicit
training about the nature of such cues might well be
beneficial among people with this neurodevelopmental
disorder. If such training was successful, it would repre-
sent a significant opportunity to enhance the lives of a
group of people who, on the basis of our results and
anecdotal reports, are clearly susceptible to exploitation.
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